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You don't have respect in those heads of yours. There is no
respect-our thoughts are all full of bad thoughts. That's all.
The way of talking nicely, the way of talking nicely with each
other, the way of straightening out the talk between two
groups, and the way of living together in harmony ... We
don't do those things. No.
A KWANGA MAN CHASTISING HIS FELLOW
COMMUNITY MEMBERS IN A COMMUNITY MEETING
Scholars who have studied social movements in many areas of Melanesia
have noted that the local people seem to be preoccupied with social order
and harmony. Many Melanesians (including the speaker in the opening
quote) complain that they and their fellow community members do not
seem to be able to get along and work together to achieve common goals.
They also say that villagers do not follow the directives of leaders; instead,
everybody wants to be in charge, and fights within the community are
endemic. Furthermore, in many areas, Melanesians think that it is because
they cannot work together and follow orders that they cannot close the
gap in wealth and power between themselves and Europeans. 1 Brunton
(1989, 112) recounted, for instance, a Tannese myth that attributes the rel-
ative powerlessness and poverty of the Tannese people to the fact that they
ignored Moses' orders and worshipped false idols when he ascended the
mountain to commune with God. Their punishment was to be divided
into many small and warring groups and to be denied the wealth and
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power that the more cooperative Europeans received. Failure to obey
leaders resulted in their being condemned to a life of divisiveness, where
people would never be able to work together to achieve material and polit-
ical parity with Westerners.
In this paper, I examine Melanesian notions about the link between
"community" (or social relations within the community) and "prosperity"
by focusing on social movements among the residents of two villages,
Inakor and Asanakor, of the eastern Kwanga language group in the
Dreikikir district of the East Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. 2 I
argue that the Kwanga, like many other Melanesians (see, for instance,
Brunton I989; Errington I974; Stent I977; Tuzin I980, I39-I4I), are pre-
occupied with social harmony because they think that prosperity depends
on it. They believe that if everyone works together, lives in harmony with
their neighbors, and follows a set of prohibitions for a short period, this
will generate a collective ritual power that will bring good harvests and
success in warfare and hunting. In short, a few months of intense commu-
nal effort may effect diffuse and generalized improvement in the quality of
life. This model applies to traditional endeavors like hunting and garden-
ing, as well as to modern ventures like cargo cults, Christian revivals, and
cash cropping schemes. Although these ventures are superficially dissimi-
lar, they all share a common feature: villagers expect that if they can get
the whole community to work together for a few months (or even a few
years) their efforts will bring general and "wondrous" results (Gesch
I984)·3
I also argue that beliefs about the link between community and prosper-
ity tend to create the characteristically short life cycle of many Melanesian
social movements, including those found among the Kwanga. People
adopt a project or a movement enthusiastically, seeing it as a possible
"road" to broad improvements in their lifestyles; but because they believe
that the project can only succeed if everyone cooperates, participants put a
great deal of pressure on their more skeptical neighbors to go along. In
turn, this pressure creates resentment and dissension within the commu-
nity. When participants in a new project realize that they face considerable
opposition, they tend to abandon their programs.
Moreover, the communal effort model has survived despite repeated
failures of modern ventures to produce the expected results because the
model is self-reinforcing. When projects fail, people do not question their
intrinsic merit but instead blame the failure on lack of cooperation (see
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Stent 1977). There is usually a grain of truth in their interpretation. Beliefs
about how fighting and disagreement undermine communal endeavors
tend to become self-fulfilling prophecies; as a result, experience continu-
ally reaffirms these beliefs.
Finally, I suggest that beliefs about the link between prosperity and
communal effort may underlie recent outbreaks of Christian revival move-
ments and the resurgence of tribal warfare in many areas of Melanesia.
Melanesians believe that the superior wealth and power of Europeans
stem from a greater ability to work together (see Brunton 1989; Errington
1974); consequently, faced with continual failure to get what the Europe-
ans have, many Melanesians have concluded that they will never be able
to emulate European standards of social harmony and cooperation and so
must pursue "the good life" in their own way. Some turn to ecstatic com-
munion with the Holy Spirit in Christian revival movements as a means of
changing the fractious and uncooperative nature of Melanesians; others
turn in the opposite direction and glorify, as a uniquely Melanesian
strength, the very "roughness" that appears to undermine business ven-
tures, by returning to activities that capitalize on this "roughness," such as
warfare.
After briefly summarizing the history of postcontact innovation in
Inakor and Asanakor, I explore the influence of traditional beliefs about
how to survive and prosper on modern Kwanga projects.
THE KWANGA
Inakor and Asanakor are located in the southern foothills of the Torricelli
Mountain range, and the residents are subsistence gardeners whose chief
crop is yams (supplemented by sago, taro, bananas, sweet potatoes, and a
variety of leafy greens). The villages are relatively large by Papua New
Guinea standards: Inakor had a population of 390 when I took a census in
1984 and Asanakor had a population of 310. I lived and worked in the area
for two years from 1984 to 1986.
The Inakor and Asanakor residents possibly first saw white people
when an Australian patrol (operating from its coastal headquarters at
Aitape) visited their villages in 1929 (Allen 1976b, 66). After 1929 the Aus-
tralian colonial administration banned warfare and homicide and started
to patrol the region sporadically. Labor recruiters came to Inakor and
Asanakor about the same time and took young men to work in gold mines
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in the Morobe district. Since that time, going away for stints of plantation
labor, often of several years, has become virtually a tradition among the
men, although plantation labor became much less popular after the intro-
duction of coffee in the I960s made it possible to earn cash locally.
World War Two also brought dramatic changes. Japanese soldiers took
refuge in this and other inland Sepik areas toward the end of the war, and
the Australian army set up local bases and recruited local men in an effort
to rout the Japanese.
The Australian colonial government extended its control over the area
after World War Two, and Christian missions also came to the eastern
Kwanga villages. The South Sea Evangelical Mission (ssEM-now the
South Sea Evangelical Church) received permission to expand activities to
the Sepik in I948 and by I95I had opened a station about ten miles to the
east of Inakor. An airstrip and mission center were established in Brugam
(about a two-hour walk to the west of Inakor) in I958, and in the same
year another station was opened in a village three or four miles south of
Asanakor. The mission selected a few promising young men to attend
Bible study courses and told them to return to the village and "spread the
good news" in weekly church services. Only a handful of people were bap-
tized in these early years. Most conversions and baptisms occurred in the
late I970S and I980s in waves associated with "revivals."
The missionaries held weekly "afternoon schools" that Inakor and
Asanakor villagers attended, and as a result many of the men and women
between thirty and forty-five are at least partly literate in Tok Pisin. In
I973, the Yubanakor Community School opened, and Inakor and Asana-
kor children now receive six years of primary schooling there. A handful
of people went on to high school and got good jobs as schoolteachers in
other areas of the country. However, more recent graduates have found
few employment opportunities and have returned to the village to live
much as their parents do.
There have been various changes in the local and national government
systems since colonization. The Australian colonial administration ap-
pointed village headmen and, as Papua New Guinea was moving toward
independence (achieved in I975), this system of indirect rule was replaced
by a democratic system of local government in which each village (or
sometimes a few small villages together) elected a councillor who attended
meetings of a local government council and conveyed information about
laws and programs to villagers. Some years later, the government created
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the village court system. Several neighboring villages are grouped together
in a "court area." Five local men serve as magistrates who hear cases from
all of the villages concerned.
These experiences have produced a widespread, but by no means uni-
versal, desire for social and economic parity with Westerners; since World
War Two,4 in attempts to attain these goals, Inakor and Asanakor villag-
ers have participated in a number of projects and movements-few have
had much long-term success. While these programs are superficially dis-
similar, they all share a number of common features that I shall outline
later.
Some of the movements seem at first glance to h2.ve entirely pragmatic
goals. In the early 1950S, local men led a movement to encourage people in
the region to plant rice. The returns were disappointing, and most people
became disillusioned rather quickly (Allen 1976b, 197). In the 1960s the
government encouraged people to plant coffee, and local big men led the
campaign to get everyone in the area involved. Coffee was somewhat
more successful than rice, and when I lived in Inakor most villagers had
coffee gardens from which they reaped an average annual income of about
one hundred fifty kina per family (about us$160). Village leaders some-
times urged people to plant more coffee, but most of my informants were
unenthusiastic and said that coffee required a great deal of work for the
money it brought. Many families had planted cocoa gardens, believing
that cocoa required less work than coffee and brought higher returns.
Villagers also pooled their money to form cooperative marketing
societies that bought local cash crops and sold them to a regional board at
a sightly higher price. The profits were supposed to be used to fund local
businesses like trade stores, but because the profit margin was slim and
the cost of transportation high, none of these societies had much success
in Inakor (although they were somewhat more profitable in villages
located near better roads).
Inakor and Asanakor residents belonged to two cargo cults. Like many
people in the Dreikikir region who were disillusioned with rice growing,
they joined the Kirapkirap cult in 1956. Its leaders said that all aspects of
customary life were sinful and stood between Papua New Guineans and
the good life of the white men. Customary ritual and magical items were
destroyed (Allen 1976b, 257-261), but people quickly lost interest when
the cargo did not materialize. Some Inakor and Asanakor villagers joined
the Peli Association (Mount Hurun movement), a cargo cult that gained
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many adherents in the Sepik region in the early 1970S (Allen 1976b; Gesch
1985; May 1982b; Roscoe 1988; Stent 1977). People paid membership fees
to the regional organization in the belief that the cargo would come after
the removal of a cement survey marker from Mount Hurun. Peli Associa-
tion members also performed various rituals designed to produce money.
Again, when the cargo failed to materialize many people lost interest. Vil-
lagers also took interest in a national election campaign and joined the
Friends of the Pangu Pati, the support group of a national political party,
in the 1970S (Allen 1976a).
Starting in the late 1960s, and continuing through the 1970S and 1980s,
many Inakor and Asanakor residents were involved in several revivals
associated with the SSEC. Revivals are periods of intense Christian activity;
people attend frequent church services, sometimes twice daily. In all-night
hymn singing and prayer meetings, people (usually women) fall to the
ground in faints, and wake sobbing and moaning (sometimes continuing
for days), claiming that they have been possessed by the Holy Spirit.
These "prophet women/ men" have visions and dreams in which the loca-
tions of secret male cult paraphernalia and sorcery implements are often
revealed to them.
In the 1970S and 1980s, those possessed by the Spirit led campaigns to
rid the area of all types of magic, and in 1984 they revealed male cult
secrets to women and children in many villages in the region. People
believed that when they had cleansed the community of all sin, including
that of worshipping false idols associated with the men's cult, Christ
would return and usher in a new age of peace and prosperity. Many of the
ideas involved in the revival were similar to those from the earlier
Kirapkirap movement in which people had also tried to cleanse the com-
munity of sin, had thrown out traditional magical items, and had under-
gone spirit possessions (Allen 1976b, 260, 261). Revivals brought great
increases in church attendance and mass baptisms. I witnessed two peri-
ods of intense revival activity, one from August to November 1984 and the
other in March-April 1985. In each case non-Christian villagers grew
skeptical of the Christians' claims after a few months, and recent converts
stopped going to church, leaving a small core of committed Christians,
many of them elderly.
Changes in national and local government structures, introduced first
by the colonial and then by the national government, also stirred people's
desires for a transformation of their lifestyle. 5 As I show later, both courts
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and councils were expected to bring much wider changes in the local life-
style than was probably intended by those who introduced these institu-
tions (see Allen 1976b; Gerritsen 1981 on unrealistic expectations of coun-
cils in Papua New Guinea).
Although these various projects and movements seem at first to have lit-
tle in common, they all share several features. Scholars have noted similar
patterns in social movements in other areas of Papua New Guinea, and I
shall note these later and suggest that my analysis of Kwanga ideas about
change may have more general implications.
First, as McDowell (1988) suggested, the local people seem to expect all
development projects and social movements to bring about dramatic (even
"cataclysmic") changes in their lives. This certainly seems to be the case in
Inakor and Asanakor. For instance, Bryant Allen (1976a, 139, 148) found
that many people thought that coffee buying cooperatives, the Peli Associ-
ation, and the Pangu Pati had roughly the same goal-to give the Papua
New Guineans a lifestyle similar to that of white men. He also found that
people's expectations of cash cropping (particularly rice) were vastly
inflated. This may be true in other areas of the country as well. May
(1982C, 421) argued that in many areas of Papua New Guinea people tend
to see self-help development projects and other types of modern move-
ments as "roads" to the same package of "broad, ambitious, and ill-
defined goals," which they previously pursued by joining cargo cults, and
that participants often expect "radical transformations in village economy
and society when, by their nature, the most that the movements [can]
offer [is] a modest improvement in village conditions" (1982C, 432).
Second, participants' understanding of the relationship between means
and desired ends tends to be rather unclear in all of the programs. As Allen
said of Dreikikir area movements, "the adoption of Peli Association mem-
bership demonstrates clearly an established trend. People joined the move-
ment, although frequently they did not understand what it was trying to
achieve, or how it was going to achieve it. They heard other men say it
was good, and they projected their own desires into it, as they had done
earlier with rice, Kirapkirap, the Pangu Pati, and to a lesser extent, with
the missions" (1976b, 281). Similarly, Allen commented that people
seemed confused about how rice growing would improve their lives. Some
of his informants thought that if they grew rice Europeans would be
pleased and would reward them with money (Allen 1976b, 181-182).
Again, the confusion about how programs will bring about the desired
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ends seems to be typical of social movements in other areas of the country
as well. May commented that cargo cults, business ventures, and national
politics alike are viewed by local people as ritual that will somehow bring
about change. He stated that
it requires a certain amount of ethnocentricity to believe that because the beha-
viour of recent movements corresponds more closely than that of cults to eco-
nomic and political norms familiar to Western trained observers, there is neces-
sarily a greater "rationality" on the part of the mass of supporters, to whom the
rituals of business organization and parliamentary politics may be no less
exotic than those of "money houses" and "memorial gardens," and for whom
the expectations about material returns may be no less unrealistic. (May
1982C,442 )
In other words, participants in most movements do not seem to under-
stand very well how their actions are supposed to bring about the desired
results.
Third, participants in almost all of the various projects and movements
try to get everyone to join and often believe that the movement will not
succeed without universal support (Stent 1977). This may explain why
almost all of the movements involve purges of traditional magic and chal-
lenges to the men's cult: leaders of projects want to ensure universal par-
ticipation by doing away with competing claims to people's loyalties and
activities, like sorcery, that could frighten people away from new projects.
I will give other examples of the stress on universal participation later.
Again, such beliefs are apparently common in cargo cults and in other
sorts of projects and movements across Melanesia. Brunton (1989, 174-
175) suggested that Melanesians abandon religious complexes when they
think that a significant proportion of the community is not following the
associated prohibitions because they believe that these complexes can only
generate power and bring material results if everyone participates. Ryan
(1969, rr6) said that Elema cargo prophets generally claimed that their
cults would only bring material wealth if everyone believed. Participants
in the Paliau movement in Manus Province also blamed the failure of
some techniques to produce money on the fact that some people had not
participated (Schwartz 1962, 350).
Fourth, all of the various types of projects tend to have a short life span.
They produce short-term bursts of communal enthusiasm, followed by
rapid disillusionment when inflated expectations are not met (Allen
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1976b, 281; May 1982C, 431,432). Allen characterized this cycle as one of
"over-enthusiastic adoption, trial, crisis and discontinuation" (1976b,
281). People enthusiastically plant a particular cash crop, contribute
money to form a cooperative, or join a Christian revival movement or a
cargo cult for a few months or even a few years. But they quickly lose
interest when dramatic rewards do not materialize and soon latch onto
some new scheme. Sometimes, as in the case of coffee growing, people
continue an old project. But they do so with little enthusiasm, realizing
that it will have limited results, and at the same time they seek another
road to more wide-sweeping change (see Gerritsen 1981). Again, May
(1982C, 431) suggested that this pattern is common in Papua New Guinea
where few self-help development programs sustain people's interest for
more than three or four years. Brunton (1989) made a similar observation
about religious complexes, saying that many areas of Melanesia were
characterized by "religious instability": people adopted new complexes
enthusiastically and then abandoned them after a few years in favor of
new complexes or in order to return to old ones.
All of these features suggest that cults and other types of movements,
among the Kwanga and perhaps in other areas as well, are shaped by simi-
lar ideas about how to bring about change. I examine these beliefs later.
COMMUNITY AND PROSPERITY
Many of the characteristics of cargo cults and other projects I have just
outlined are the product of a traditional model in which a short-term burst
of communal cooperation and harmony was supposed to produce a gener-
alized improvement in the quality of life.
This model is perhaps most apparent in male cult initiations. Political
authority among the Kwanga is closely tied to a male initiation cult. Since
World War Two there have been only three initiation ceremonies, but
before that men were initiated into six grades of the cult, starting as boys
and finishing as old men, and gained knowledge of, and the necessary rit-
ual heat to empower, magic necessary for success in hunting and garden-
ing. Certain lineage headmen also received magic to control weather, fam-
ine, and success in warfare after they were initiated into higher grades in
the cult.
Successful initiations were believed to produce a generalized ritual
power that brought about broad improvements in the quality of local life:
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people could grow better yams and succeed in hunts and warfare (Tuzin
1976).6 Gesch (1984) suggested that initiates believed they would learn the
magical and ritual knowledge that would allow them to understand, and
thus control, a previously mysterious world; consequently they believed
that initiations would produce unexpected and "wondrous" results. 7
But people thought that this would only be possible if everyone partici-
pated, lived in harmony with their neighbors, and cooperated by observ-
ing an elaborate series of prohibitions. For several months before and dur-
ing an initiation, everyone in the community had to work hard to grow
food, and had to observe prohibitions on eating certain kinds of food, on
having sexual intercourse, and on washing. One uncooperative person
could spoil everything. For example, several men told me indignantly
about one man who had violated a prohibition by sleeping with his wife
during a male cult initiation and had thereby lessened his whole moiety's
ritual heat. As a result, it had been impossible to decorate that moiety's
initiates very well since the body paint was "cold" and would not stick to
their skins.
Similar ideas were apparent in other endeavors. The Kwanga believed
that in order for communal endeavors such as hunting and yam gardening
to succeed people had to observe a series of prohibitions on eating certain
kinds of food and on contact with the opposite sex, and had to avoid
fighting with each other before and during the activity. Scaglion (1976)
found a marked decrease in disputes among the Kwanga's neighbors, the
Abelam, in the yam-growing season, indicating that people took these
ideas seriously (see also Stent 1977). Even one person who failed to
observe the prohibitions could ruin the whole endeavor. In Inakor, for
instance, people blamed the (frequent) failure of communal hunts on
fighting within the community. Similarly, Stent (1977) said that among the
Abelam unsuccessful harvests led to a witch hunt for those who had
spoiled everything by violating prohibitions.
People had various ideas about how cooperation and harmony were
related to good fortune and prosperity. In some cases, people seemed to
believe that fighting in the community would lead to sabotage. For
instance, if someone fought with a hunting magician or a sorcerer, he
could express his displeasure by using his magic to sabotage a communal
venture.
People viewed sorcerers and magicians as an impartial moral force that
disapproved of bickering and fighting and would sabotage communal ven-
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tures or kill people in order to remind the whole community of the impor-
tance of living in harmony. Sorcerers and other kinds of magicians were
believed to act as a "police force" that helped the leaders of the community
(men who had been initiated into the penultimate grade of the cult) to pre-
serve law and order. Informants said that if there was a great deal of fight-
ing in the community, magicians would be displeased and would sabotage
the hunt in order to teach the whole community a lesson about how to live
together properly. Similarly, people often said the sorcerers sometimes
killed people just to stop fighting in the community.
People also seemed to have a vague idea that fighting or violating prohi-
bitions would make the whole community "cold," and would neutralize
magic, as was evident in the earlier example of my informants' interpreta-
tion of the consequences of a man sleeping with his wife during an initia-
tion. The Kwanga had an elaborate set of beliefs about ritual "hotness"
and "coldness." Briefly, avoiding certain kinds of food and contact with
females, and eating other kinds of food was supposed to generate ritual
heat, which empowered an individual's magic. People never explicitly said
to me that one person's ritual heat was linked to that of another (unless
the two shared the same food), but they clearly thought that magic would
fail if the observation of prohibitions was less than universal, indicating
that they did have some unarticulated notion of collective ritual heat.
Scaglion (1976) noted that the neighboring Abelam people believed that
fighting during the yam-growing season would reduce the potency of yam
magic, indicating a similar notion that collective ritual heat depended on
harmony and cooperation.
The idea that dramatic and general improvements in life could result
from short-term, but universal, cooperation and harmony was also appar-
ent in some form or another in virtually all of the programs to promote
social and economic change. Leaders always tried to get everyone to par-
ticipate and they discouraged fighting in the community. People usually
seemed to expect dramatic improvements in their lives in the near future.
For instance, the leaders of the Peli Association said that their objectives
would be achieved only after everyone joined (Allen 1976b, 269), and at
one stage the prophet Yaliwan tried to get everyone to live in harmony to
pave the way for the return of Jesus (Allen 1976a, 146). As well, people
seemed to expect the cult to bring about a generalized improvement in
their lives in the short run.
The influence of the traditional model was apparent in the Christian
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revival movement. For instance, Abel, the Inakor pastor, referred to the
revival as the work of the Holy Spirit and said, "The work of the Holy
Spirit is just like performing a male cult initiation: everyone has to cooper-
ate." The Christian revivalists often insisted that the revival could not
eliminate sorcery and improve community life if some people remained "in
the dark" and did not believe in God and the Bible. Some people also said
that Jesus would not return until everyone believed in the Bible and
stopped sinning. One man said in a public meeting:
Some men say: "Each man should do what he wants. Whoever wants to be
[Christian], alright then he will go to Heaven when he dies." But that's not
right. Jesus didn't die for just one man. He died for all the men of the earth. We
didn't come up out of nothing. God made all of us. He didn't die for just one
man, that only one man should believe and then He'll come and take just that
one man to heaven. Jesus didn't die for just one or two men.... He's waiting
for all of you to believe before he comes.
Here again the speaker suggests that, like traditional endeavors, the
revival will only work if everyone follows the rules.
People stressed the need for communal harmony. They said that the
revival would only succeed if the whole community was wanbel, the Tok
Pisin term for being in agreement. The revivalists seemed to think that
such goodwill would produce a generalized spiritual power and that, con-
versely, fighting would diminish this power. For example, the Christians
often said that communal hymns and prayers seemed heavy, ugly, and
ineffective if there was discord in the congregation. When they prayed to
God to cure sick people, the Christians would first ask if everyone was
wanbe/, believing that their prayers would be ineffective if someone was
harboring a secret grievance. Similarly, in a community meeting the
Inakor pastor once urged people not to fight, saying that God would be
displeased by bickering in the community and would take away the power
of the Holy Spirit: "This power comes from God. It's not something you
can buy with money. People made a lot of trouble and God wanted to take
his power back again.... The power of God has slackened and now
we're in a mess. God makes this power. If we argue and fight he will take
his power back." Fighting was also supposed to diminish individual ritual
power. George, the Asanakor pastor, for example, claimed that after he
had fought with his wife, his spiritual powers had been lessened and he
had been unable to divine and ward off a sorcerer's attack.
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There was some difference of opinion about what this universal partici-
pation and communal harmony would produce but, as in the case of male
cult initiations, everyone anticipated broad improvements in their lives.
Some people, like the speaker just quoted, thought that communal har-
mony and universal belief would eventually bring Jesus back to earth.
Others thought that Christianity would help everyone to get along and to
behave well, and thus would create a suitable environment for communal
business ventures to flourish. These people also thought that God would
bless business projects, and as a result they would be much more success-
ful. One young Christian man expressed this view in an interview:
If we all think of ourselves our business won't work out well. It will break
down. If we think of God first then our business will run well. We can't just
think of business. We must think of God too. Then He can bless us and our
business will work out well. I think if we run a business and believe in God it
will turn out well. We won't steal or ruin things. We will run it the Christian
way. If people who aren't Christian run the business they will steal some of the
money or food. A man who believes will run the business well and won't pilfer
the money.
In other words, just as traditionally success was thought to depend on a
combination of hard work, good organizational ability, and help from the
ancestors, so this young man believes that profitable business enterprises
depend on work, cooperation, and God's blessing. More generally, the
revivalists apparently believed that a short-term burst of communal coop-
eration and harmony would produce a dramatic and general improvement
in life.
Scholars often attribute ideas about harmony and communal work to
Christian influence, or to the fact that Europeans appeared to the Papua
New Guineans to be highly orderly and peaceful people with an extraordi-
nary ability to cooperate with each other (Allen 1980; Errington 1974).
But I suggest that there is also traditional precedent for these beliefs and
that some of the revivalists' beliefs owe more to traditional models than to
missionary influence. This traditional influence was evident in the behav-
ior of Christian "prophets" who had been possessed by the Holy Spirit:
just as people believed that sorcerers and other magicians had to avoid
contact with women to preserve ritual heat, so the Christian "prophets"
believed that their ritual powers would be diminished by contact with the
opposite sex.
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It was evident that people's ideas about God's response to fighting in the
community were shaped by their beliefs about sorcerers (see also Eyre
I988). People saw both God and sorcerers as a sort of impartial moral
force that would punish the whole community if a lot of people were fight-
ing. The Inakor pastor suggested that God would take his spiritual power
away from the village if people fought. In another meeting, a man voiced
similar ideas about sorcerers, saying that sorcerers watched over the vil-
lage and noted all the little fights and would punish the whole community
by killing people if there was too much bickering and dissent:
All the little problems from before, all the little fights over land and sago and
water, they kept adding these things up.... So sorcery started. You can't just
go and think: "I haven't done anything. Why do we have sorcery?" You must
think of all the trouble you have made before. 1 tell you all the time ... that
you shouldn't fight over little things. But you fight and look, the village is in a
mess now.
Similarly, the belief in the ritualistic power of communal harmony to ren-
der prayers more effective could stem from earlier beliefs about the neces-
sity for communal harmony to empower hunting and gardening magic-
which were reported by Scaglion (I976) and Stent (I977) in neighboring
language groups not influenced by SSEC revivals.
The influence of beliefs in the efficacy of a short-term burst of commu-
nal cooperation were less obvious in other endeavors, but there was still
evidence that this traditional model had an impact on people's approaches
to such things as cash cropping and cooperative societies. For instance,
people in the Dreikikir region apparently thought that these ventures
could potentially bring about broad changes in village life but would only
work if everyone participated. Bryant Allen (I98o) said that while people
in many areas of the country resisted the idea of communal gardens, peo-
ple in the Sepik area planted communal rice gardens of their own accord,
even though agricultural officers discouraged it. He also noted reports of
leaders trying to force their fellow villagers to plant cash crops and slap-
ping those who refused, or who would not weed their gardens (I976b).
My informants thought it was important for everyone to plant cash crops.
The Inakor magistrate once forced all of the young men in the community
who had not yet planted coffee gardens to stand up in front of the whole
community while he lectured them. People told me that individual coffee
gardens could only give people a little private spending money; only com-
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munal gardens and cooperative societies could "lift up" the whole village.
As in other activities, people expected communal effort in cash cropping
to produce a generalized improvement in the quality of their lives: they
anticipated that the village would be "lifted up," or, in other words, village
life would be better.
The influence of traditional models was evident in people's ideas about
the village court and local government council systems. In an interview,
Ronald, the Inakor magistrate, revealed that he equated the power of
magistrates and councillors with the power of male cult initiates. Ronald
characterized magistrates, councillors, and business leaders as having an
almost mystical power to keep order in the village. He said that after he
took a short magistrate-training course he returned to the village deter-
mined to root out sorcery. When I asked him why he was not afraid for his
life he replied:
Because I had gotten this kind of power from God, ah, the government. I
didn't think they could defeat me. I could defeat them. When the government
gave me this kind of power, when I got this kind of training, I thought ... the
government had given me a certificate and gave me the power and I became
like a lawyer and they appointed me and gave me power over the men here
... [When we graduated from the training course they said:] "You have this
kind of power so you will win. If you were just an ordinary man they would
defeat you right away."
Q: What kind of power did the government give you?
Ronald: They wrote my name in the government gazette and [gave me] this
knowledge I have now. This is justice now.
Ronald's understanding of the power of modern leaders appears to be col-
ored by his assumptions about traditional leaders. Traditional leaders had
secret ritual knowledge through which they controlled nature and society.
Possibly, Ronald is equating the modern magistrates' knowledge of justice
with this sort of ritual knowledge; this interpretation is supported by
Ronald's slip when he first says that the magistrates' power comes from
God-a religious and mystical source similar to the ancestors and spirits
who were believed to empower traditional knowledge or magic-and then
corrects himself and attributes the magistrates' power to the government.
This slip might indicate that Ronald believes that modern leaders have a
generalized power derived from God similar to traditional leaders' ritual
and magical power, which was derived from the spirits. And, just as tradi-
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tionalleaders could only help the community survive and prosper if every-
one cooperated, so the councillors and magistrates often warned their fel-
low villagers that the "new law" would only work if everyone in the com-
munity cooperated and followed orders. The village magistrate, for
instance, explained in a community meeting that the courts could only
replace sorcery as a system of justice if everyone cooperated and obeyed
court orders. Again, communal cooperation and ritual power to improve
village life (in this case socially, by stopping sorcery and keeping order)
were linked in people's minds.
In short, there is some evidence that ideas about the relationship
between the community and the environment shape people's approach to
modern ventures. Just as traditionally people followed rules, tried to live
in harmony with their neighbors, and pressured everyone to participate in
order to create a generalized ritual power that brought prosperity, secu-
rity, and the good life, so they apparently use the same model to pursue
modern goals.
While the emphasis on harmony and cooperation in modern move-
ments undoubtedly stems at least in part from comments made by Europe-
ans, there is considerable traditional precedent for the idea that prosperity
and well-being depend on communal cooperation and harmony. There
are indications that this is true in other areas of the country as well. Brun-
ton (I989) and Lawrence (I964) both noted that communal observation of
prohibitions was thought to be necessary for magic to work in many areas
of Melanesia.
Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising, as Brunton (I989) has suggested,
that conditions in relatively egalitarian communities, often comprising
rivalrous subgroups, would foster a preoccupation with problems of
cooperation and harmony. It is always difficult to make and enforce deci-
sions in a large group without strong leaders. This situation is exacerbated
in Kwanga villages, and other Melanesian communities of a similar type
(see Lawrence I969), by the division of the community into rivalrous sub-
groups. Kwanga villages comprise two cross-cutting moiety sets, and a
number of lineages; each of these subgroups guards its autonomy jeal-
ously and resents interference from other groups. In this situation, it is
very difficult for anyone to lead the whole community effectively since
anything the leader does will arouse virtually automatic resentment and
resistance from members of other subgroups. In short, many things make
coordinating communal ventures difficult in Kwanga villages and create
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fights and hard feelings between fellow community members. Conse-
quently, it might be expected that Inakor and Asanakor villagers (and
other Melanesians) have devoted a lot of thought to the problems of per-
suading everyone to get along with each other and work together.
Ideas about the link between "community" and "prosperity" could
account for the characteristic features of cargo cults and other movements
I outlined earlier. First, people expect both cults and other schemes to
produce dramatic results over the short run because, according to their
ideas about how to prosper, short-term bursts of communal effort were
supposed to create a generalized power that had wide-ranging results. I
differ from McDowell (1988) here in suggesting that people do not expect
a "cataclysmic" or total transformation in their lives but only expect pro-
jects to bring about broad improvements. The Kwanga, for instance, did
not expect coffee-buying cooperatives to raise the dead or transform the
earth, but did expect them to bring both dramatic wealth and other
improvements in the quality of life.
Second, people do not have very clear ideas about the relationship
between means and ends in projects because they are operating on a model
which suggests that following rules and working hard will generate a gen-
eralized power that will be felt in various, not entirely predictable, ways.
Third, perhaps people want everyone to join in projects and move-
ments because they think that ventures will only succeed if pragmatic
actions are empowered by ritual heat generated by communal coopera-
tion.
Finally, movements are generally short-lived because people are operat-
ing on a model in which short-term communal effort is supposed to be all
that is necessary to generate the communal power that leads to prosperity.
Consequently, they expect projects to produce immediate results and lose
interest if these do not materialize.
CONSENSUS AND STRIFE
Among the Kwanga, traditional beliefs about the relationship between the
community and the rest of the world seem to have a self-perpetuating
quality. People believe that communal cooperation is necessary for suc-
cess, but harmony and universal participation are very difficult to achieve.
It is almost inevitable that there will be differences of opinion in large
groups of people, and so it is difficult to get everyone to cooperate in
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societies, like Kwanga villages, where there is no strong central leadership
to make decisions and force people to comply. Because people believe that
projects will only succeed if everyone in the village cooperates, project
leaders put pressure on skeptics to participate. This pressure, however,
creates resentment and eventually produces the very disharmony and bad
feeling that are believed to defeat communal projects. As a result, people
can always, with some-truth, attribute failure to bickering in the village
and do not question their underlying beliefs about how to prosper. In
short, experience tends to suggest over and over again that social failings
stand between Papua New Guineans and the good life.
These processes were evident in a series of public meetings to look into
deaths that took place during my two-year stay in Inakor and Asanakor.
The Kwanga usually held meetings after deaths to find the sorcerer
responsible. Interestingly, these discussions also provided rare glimpses
into people's ideas about current communal projects. Villagers were par-
ticularly interested in the Christian revival movement in the 1984-1986
inquests. The revivalists had attacked sorcery directly by divining the
presence of sorcery implements and by having the owners jailed on
charges of possessing sorcery paraphernalia. They had also persuaded
many sorcerers to convert to Christianity and to renounce their evil ways.
Consequently, each death indicated to the villagers that the revival was
failing, and people spent a great deal of time in inquests trying to figure
out what was going wrong. The discussion of sorcery often led to a more
general debate about why the revivalists had failed to persuade Jesus to
return after so many months of fervent worship.
In the 1984 and 1985 meetings many people stressed the need for univer-
sal cooperation and blamed the apparent failure of the revival to eliminate
sorcery and bring back Jesus on non-Christians who were being uncooper-
ative. Speakers, including several non-Christians, exhorted everyone to do
as the Christians asked. An Asanakor man suggested that people would
continue to die in Inakor until the whole village had converted to Christi-
anity and stood united in the effort to get rid of sinful magic. As it was,
Christians and non-Christians were always bickering with each other, and
this diverted energy away from their common interest in eliminating sor-
cery. The Inakor pastor suggested that such bickering was likely to dis-
please God and cause him to take away the Christians' prophetic powers.
This pressure initially seemed to work: vocal opposition to the revival
ceased and non-Christians often voiced support for the Christians in meet-
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ings. But beneath the surface, resentment against the Christians appar-
ently increased and eventually undermined the revival. When, after sev-
eral months, the Christians failed to stop sorcery and bring back Jesus, the
revival leaders themselves were willing to continue and to wait indefinitely
for these rewards. Even when the death of the young daughter of the
Asanakor pastor, George, seemed to prove that the Christians could not
stop sorcery, staunch supporters did not lose faith in the revival. George
told me privately that the revival must go on, as it was the only way to end
fighting and improve village life. He said that it did not matter if sorcerers
had killed his daughter since he would be reunited with her in heaven. But
others in the community threatened to withdraw their support, or even to
prosecute the Christians, unless they produced immediate results.
Most of these demands came from people who had had doubts about
the revival and resented the pressure that had been put on them to con-
form. They said that they had been forced to abandon the men's cult and
the associated magic against their will and spoke resentfully of the Chris-
tians' autocratic attitudes. Several people, for instance, said that they had
heard people in Apangai, a nearby village where Inakor and Asanakor
Christians had revealed cult secrets and magical items to women and chil-
dren, demand that the revival produce "fruit" (in other words, bring back
Jesus) soon to justify the loss of their magical paraphernalia. Apangai peo-
ple were alleged to have said: "You've done it so now this [revival] must
come true and bear fruit. You can't destroy my things and then let this
work [come to nothing]. If you do that I will deal with you some time in
the future." People also claimed they had heard people in Apangai say:
Alright, you Inakor and Asanakor. You are big men and came and threw out
all of our [men's cult and magical paraphernalia]. You are out of reach now.
We are your black men [Tok Pisin: kanaka]. You have become white men now
and we are just black men living in the bush, and so you do this. You are real
men and came and threw out our things. We are rats or black men. We can't do
anything to you now. We are from the bush. You are white men now. 8
In these speeches, people linked the demands for dramatic rewards, and
vague threats of retaliation if these rewards did not materialize, with being
forced to act against their will: "You've done it so now this [revival] must
come true and bear fruit. You can't destroy my things and then let this
work [come to nothing]." The quotes reveal that people resent the revival
leaders for trying to boss other people around and showing no respect for
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others' opinions. The leaders are characterized as acting as if they were
"real men" and "white men" and thus were much too grand to consult a
bunch of "bush people" before destroying cult paraphernalia. Now, the
skeptics demand that the leaders produce proof of the efficacy of their
grand schemes-probably in the expectation that the leaders will not be
able to "pay up" and they will be publicly humiliated, a just punishment
for their disrespectful treatment of others a few months before.
Such resentment is a virtually inevitable result of decentralized Kwanga
social structure. Villages are led by a group of initiates of the penultimate
grade of the men's cult who are supposed to agree on matters of commu-
nal concern. When one of this group tries to claim paramount authority,
as the revival leaders did by throwing out cult paraphernalia without uni-
versal consent, the others resent it. As well, as I have already noted,
Kwanga villages comprise two cross-cutting moiety sets and several lin-
eages, and each of these subgroups resents it when a member of another
group tries to lead them. Thus, any attempt to coordinate the whole vil-
lage meets almost automatic opposition.
Ironically, according to local ideas about the need for universal partici-
pation, the revival leaders were almost forced to act in this autocratic
fashion: they, like other movement leaders, believe that no venture will
succeed unless they can get everyone to cooperate-and it is virtually
impossible to get everyone to agree on any new project, particularly
because community leaders are jealous of each other's prestige. When one
gains prominence by introducing a new project, his rivals are likely to
oppose it on principle.
Thus, movement leaders are in a double bind: they must try to force
everyone to cooperate but when they do others resent the autocratic
behavior and try to humble the leader by making vague threats or by look-
ing for the first excuse to withdraw their support and declare the move-
ment a failure. Similarly, Ryan (I969) said that cargo prophets among the
Toaripi £lema inevitably meet opposition from other community leaders
who fear the prophet is getting too powerful.
Rivals undermine movements like the revival in two ways. First, like
the Apangai people, they make veiled threats that probably frighten some
of the less staunch supporters away from movements. They fear they may
face sorcery or court if the movement does not produce results soon and
so they abandon it. Unfortunately, because I left Inakor and Asanakor
shortly after the death of George's daughter, I am unable to comment on
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the effect of this death on the Asanakor revival. But the Inakor revivalists
had ceased their efforts in face of opposition as I show later. Second, when
the skeptics use current failures as an excuse to stop cooperating, other,
more committed, participants abandon projects just because they believe
that nothing can succeed without unanimous support. 9 This is a conse-
quence of the traditional beliefs about the importance of consensus and
universal cooperation. For example, the Inakor pastor announced in a
community meeting in May 1986 that the Inakor Christians had decided to
temporarily halt their revival activities because several non-Christian men
had decided to stage large commercial parties, against the explicit wishes
of the mission. The pastor commented that the revival, unlike normal
Christian activities, could not proceed without universal support. (Inter-
estingly, informants said very similar things about men's cult initiations-
illustrating the close conceptual link between initiations and other activi-
ties in peoples' minds. People said that they had planned to stage an
initiation but had, at least temporarily, abandoned their plans when the
revival came to Inakor because they knew that the Christians would not
support the initiation, and might even undermine it by revealing key
secrets in public. But non-Christians said that they would wait until peo-
ple lost interest in the revival and might take up their plans for the initia-
tion some time in the future.) Consequently, from the local point of view,
projects are never shown to be inherently unsound since they are never
given a fair chance to succeed; instead, what people see proven again and
again, is that communal ventures cannot succeed because Papua New
Guineans are unable to cooperate and work together. 10
In speaking of past failures, people often refer to social factors rather
than to external factors or intrinsic deficiencies in a program. For
instance, when the latest coffee-buying cooperative went broke, few peo-
ple attributed the failure to the factors that seemed most obvious to me,
namely, poor roads that raised transportation costs, and low coffee prices.
Instead, many villagers blamed the failure on the fact that followers had
been uncooperative and had fought amongst themselves. One man sum-
marized these views in a public meeting:
We are always angry and are always fighting. When we all contribute money
or bags of coffee, if someone wants to start a project with these contributions,
and then something goes wrong then everyone, all the men and women will
really complain, and criticize him and talk behind his back. At their houses, in
their gardens, when they have community meetings, they will complain about
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this man. They will complain and complain and this man will hear what they
are saying and be sick of it and leave this work. Then the work will come to
nothing. They won't think: "Oh, we have given our money to him so we will
leave it with him to run it as he wishes, according to his knowledge. We won't
tell him what to do. We will just watch him and see what he does." If we did
that the work would go well. But they give money and when he tries to run the
project and he runs into just a little trouble, sorry! All the men, all the women,
will really say awful things. They do it like that and none of our projects go
well.... It's our own fault.
In this case, as in others I witnessed, people attributed the cooperative's
failure to social problems. They thought that villagers were unable to
work together and to follow the directives of leaders. Instead, each man
wanted to be his own boss and, consequently, villagers were always fight-
ing with each other and with their leaders. They could not get along, and
so the projects were doomed to failure. But because people focused on
social problems they were willing to tryout another cooperative scheme
that differed very little from one that had already failed.
In other cases, people blamed the leaders for failures. They thought
that leaders were singularly lacking in community spirit and always pur-
sued their own interests at the expense of their fellow villagers. Bryant
Allen's interviews with leaders in other parts of the Dreikikir region reveal
similar themes. Leaders of two cooperative societies, for instance, said
that the participants in the society blamed the leaders when local rice
failed to bring vast material wealth (Allen 1976b, 362,373), This reveals a
similar kind of thinking: people do not question the intrinsic merits of
programs but instead blame failure on uncooperative members of the
community who put their own desires above the interests of the collec-
tivity.
Ryan made a similar point about the Toaripi of the GuHProvince:
The failure of anyone prophet does not shake people's belief that at some time
a leader with the right message will appear and show them the way to a new
life. The failure of a particular prophet is generally ascribed to the wickedness
and blindness of his opponents, who spoiled the movement with their scepti-
cism; or to the fact that he did not really have the true message but was build-
ing up his own position at the expense of his fellows. (1969,100)
Furthermore, as is already evident, among both the Kwanga and the
Toaripi there is a certain truth to these conclusions since political rivals
and others do resent innovators' autocratic attitudes and try to humble
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them by undermining their projects. In short, objective difficulties in coor-
dinating communal endeavors in small egalitarian communities like
Kwanga villages reinforce people's ideas that divisiveness stands between
them and the good life.
ORDER, HARMONY, AND THE GOOD LIFE
Kwanga villagers seem to be unusually preoccupied with themes of com-
munity harmony: they believe that the good life is within their reach if
only they can get everyone to cooperate, and they blame failures on fight-
ing within the community.
I have traced these beliefs to a traditional model under which a short-
term burst of enthusiasm produces a generalized ritual power with broad
results, and have further argued that experience never contradicts (and,
indeed, usually reinforces) people's underlying assumptions about change.
When movements fail, people can always point to dissension in the com-
munity as the source of the trouble, thus reinforcing their basic belief in
the importance of consensus for success. This creates a vicious cycle: the
more people blame things on social problems, the more they pressure oth-
ers to participate in projects against their wills. This pressure creates the
resentment and discord on which participants can always, with some jus-
tice, blame the failure of their projects.
The repeated (perceived) failure of projects was apparently leading vil-
lagers to the conclusion that Papua New Guineans are intrinsically differ-
ent from Westerners and that the Papua New Guineans fractious ways
stand between them and the good life. Speakers in meetings often con-
trasted their fellow villagers' contentious and unruly behavior with the
harmonious and obedient ways of the Europeans. People argued that
"black men" would never get ahead and prosper because they were always
bickering and fighting among themselves. The opening quote of the paper,
for instance, illustrates this sort of discourse. That particular statement
was made by the village magistrate during an inquest.
Similar conclusions have led some people to look for a way to change
the Papua New Guinean character. The young man quoted earlier, for
instance, said that faith in God would help people cooperate and allow
ventures to succeed. Other people told me that they found it very difficult
not to fight with others, and that only strong faith in God, and particu-
larly receiving the Holy Spirit, had allowed them to overcome their own
natures. The Asanakor pastor, for instance, described his conversion
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experience by saying it was as if God had wrung out all his old blood and
old ways like water from a towel:
The way of envy and fighting and brooding-it started to leave me and
another kind of thought came.... I told you before, God was turning my
blood just like wringing out a towel. ... It's like this, the water, I am speaking
metaphorically now, the water is like the bad thoughts from before. The ways
of my father, mother, and the blood of my father and mother, were in me.
Some of these things I myself did when I was young and when I was married.
Others, however, express despair at the prospect of ever being able to
get people to change. One man described the failure, in turn, of village
headmen, a succession of councillors, village court magistrates, and the
revivalists to subdue the villagers:
Before I was afraid of the [village headmen appointed by the Australian colo-
nial administration]. Then I watched his ways and put him behind me. Then I
was afraid of the Councillor, then I learned his ways, and put him behind me.
Then another came up: the village magistrate. I was afraid of him and behaved
but then I saw his ways and wasn't afraid. Now look, I am walking all over the
magistrate now. Then the revival came up. I threw out all of my [magic] but no
-I know and am holding onto my things now. I am not afraid.
Similar thoughts have led some of the villagers to conclude that they
should abandon attempts to pursue prosperity through Western ways
altogether and should seek solutions which capitalize on Papua New
Guineans' unique strengths. Bryant Allen (1980) said that a prominent
Dreikikir man who had taken the lead in introducing cash crops and coop-
eratives and had participated in the local government system had, by the'
end of his life, concluded that these things would never work for the
Papua New Guineans, who should seek wealth their own way through
cargo cults and initiations. Similarly an elderly Asanakor Christian (who
had also been a village headman) suggested that submitting to the law and
the church had only made Papua New Guineans into weak and dependent
"women" in a white man's world. He said that his village, Asanakor, had
been "rough" and able to defend themselves against sorcerers until "the
law and the mission" came and "beat" them "down":
Inakor village you are all just women-lots of time I've come up here because
men have died.... I, Asanakor, have another kind of head: whoever does
anything to me, I finish it right away-I, Asanakor, I am another kind: I am a
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rough village. Before, I was really really rough. You, Inakor village, no. You
are just women. It is just now that the law and the mission have come and beat
me down.
He spoke again later of earlier times when people had been rough and
able to defend themselves:
If I was still in charge we would have gotten rid of sorcery a long time ago.
Look when Japan came to Wewak [during World War Two] the natives there
were protected by white men. But when they came here to the bush it was just
us. We ourselves, we bush people [Tok Pisin: bus kanaka], killed and threw
out the Japanese, then we threw out all of the sorcerers. Now the council and
the magistrate are weak.
Thus, people's beliefs about the link between community and prosper-
ity have a far-reaching impact on their approach to change. In turn this
could have serious consequences in the future, perhaps in the form of a
resurgence of such activities as warfare which capitalize on the (perceived)
fractious nature of Papua New Guineans, or, alternatively, in increasing
popularity of such activities as revival movements, which seem to promise
release from this nature.
There are indications of similar patterns in other areas. The ideas that
everyone in the community has to cooperate for magic to work and that
fighting within the village is inimical to prosperity are quite common in
lowland and insular Melanesia. For instance, Lawrence (I964, 225), sug-
gested that people in many areas of Melanesia believe that the whole com-
munity must follow prohibitions for magic to work, and ethnographers
have noted that people in many areas believe that fighting or suppressed
anger causes illness and can sabotage communal activities like fishing
(Schwartz I962, 307; White & Watson-Gegeo I990). Likewise, in many
areas, bad weather, droughts, deaths, and poor harvests always led to an
examination of conflicts in the community (see Brison I988; Young I97I;
Young I983).
As among the Kwanga, such beliefs may lead to the common emphasis
on the necessity for cooperation, harmony, and universal participation in
order for cargo cults to succeed. For instance, just as traditional activities
were thought to depend on everyone getting along and observing a com-
plex set of prohibitions, so cargo cult leaders often said that the cargo
would not come until people lived in harmony and followed an elaborate
code of behavior (Lawrence I964, 80). Lawrence noted (I964, 82) that in
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the Madang area people thought that the cargo would only come if every-
one converted to Christianity and followed the ten commandments. Yali,
the leader of a Madang movement, also attributed Papua New Guineans'
poverty to their lack of social organization (Lawrence 1964,123).
The parallels are particularly striking between Kwanga analyses of their
social movements and those of participants in the Paliau movement in
Manus. Manus villagers frequently stressed the need for everyone to coop-
erate and to follow the directives of leaders. One of Paliau's followers, for
instance, stressed that Jesus' chief message had been that people should
not fight among themselves (Schwartz 1962, 255, 259). Paliau himself also
said that the movement would never succeed unless people stopped fight-
ing among themselves and obeyed their leaders (Schwartz 1962, 263). Cult
participants were supposed to avoid doing things like gossiping and boast-
ing, which could cause trouble in the group (Schwartz 1962, 264), and
people were encouraged to reveal all their hidden grievances in public so
that the community could attain a state of perfect harmony (Schwartz
1962, 285).
As in Inakor and Asanakor, the belief that success required universal
cooperation resulted in a great deal of public badgering of skeptics. Lead-
ers frequently exhorted their followers to be more cooperative and chas-
tened those who did not obey leaders (Schwartz 1962, 298, 303). As the
cult progressed people began to complain more and more about dissen-
sion within villages (Schwartz 1962, 303), perhaps indicating that, as in
Inakor and Asanakor, the pressure to conform actually increased opposi-
tion to the movement. Finally, as in Inakor and Asanakor, when one
phase of the movement failed, the Manus people retrospectively said this
was because villages had been divided in their support (Schwartz 1962,
350). Thus, in the Paliau movement, a belief in the need for cooperation
seemed to have produced dissension that caused participants to abandon
the movement, but then to later conclude that they might have succeeded
if only everyone had cooperated.
There are also indications that people all over the country are reaching
similar conclusions about the nature of Papua New Guineans and their
society. For instance, Paliau complained that his followers were not like
white men who "could make a group decision and carry it out" (Schwartz
1962, 263). Paliau scolded his followers for being unlike the people of
other countries where: "if [leaders] were men with good ideas who gave
their ideas to the rest, [they] are obeyed by their followers. Whatever they
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say is listened to and carried out" (Schwartz 1962, 352). Paliau also urged
his followers to try to maintain unity and harmony within the group (Sch-
wartz 1962, 264) in order to become more like the white men. Errington
(1974) suggested that Karavar Islanders seem to be as much enamored
with Europeans' ability to live in harmony and to cooperate with each
other as with their wealth.
In concluding, examining the beliefs that seem to inform both cargo
cults and the local people's approach to other types of projects and move-
ments has revealed an obsession with social harmony that seems to shape
a wide range of behavior. Modern movements seem always to fail in local
eyes, and each new failure proves to people that they cannot do something
they traditionally prided themselves on, that is, to transcend petty bicker-
ing in the community and launch magnificent and empowering communal
endeavors like male cult initiations.
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Notes
I See, for instance: Allen (1976b, 200-201) on Dreikikir district people; Brun-
ton (1989) on the Tannese; Counts and Counts (1976, 295-297) on the Kaliai of
East New Britain; Errington (1974, 258, 263, 264) on Karavar Island; Lawrence
(1964,123) on the Yali movement in Madang.
2 I refer to "the Kwanga" for convenience, but the statements in this paper
apply to eastern Kwanga villages (speakers of the "Kwanga Two" dialect) and not
to the western, "Kwanga One," villages.
3 Errington (1974), McDowell (1988), and Scaglion (1983) also argue that
Papua New Guineans approach cargo cults, new religious movements, and more
pragmatic development projects with similar ideas and expectations. They all
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suggest that Melanesians have an "episodic" view of history that shapes their
expectations of all kinds of social movements. People expect programs designed
to bring about specific and limited sorts of changes to have much more dramatic
results. On the similarity between expectations of cargo cults and other sorts of
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politics: Adams 1982, 66; Allen 1976a; Gerritsen 1981; Kaima 1989; Schwartz
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dence provoked a great deal of anxiety and fear, since people thought that this
would lead to an apocalyptic transformation of their world.
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ness ventures and conclude that these activities are failures when they do not
produce the excessive and wondrous results that were traditionally believed to
follow cult initiations.
8 This highly sarcastic comment pointed to the arrogance displayed by the
Inakor and Asanakor Christians when they revealed men's cult paraphernalia to
women and children in Apangai without the permission of the village leaders.
The members of the Inakor-Asanakor team had acted as if they were so much
more powerful and knowledgeable than the Apangai people that they need not
bother to respect local wishes. The statement also contains a veiled threat against
the revivalists who are characterized as foolishly acting as if they were "out of
reach now" and need not fear retaliation.
9 lowe this insight to Stephen Leavitt. Brunton (1989) made a similar observa-
tion about religious movements. He said that when villagers begin to suspect that
some people are not following the requisite prohibitions, they will abandon reli-
gious comptexes fearing either that these complexes will become weak and will
not provide adequate power to fend off outside attack or that they will lose con-
trol over the power generated by the movement and it will prey randomly on
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10 Brunton argued that people will return to past religious complexes, think-
ing that these only failed in the past because of dissension in the community.
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